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020 _a9783319042626
_9978-3-319-04262-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-04262-6
_2doi
035 _ato000542655
040 _aSpringer
_cSpringer
_dRU-ToGU
050 4 _aBJ1-1725
072 7 _aHPQ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI005000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a170
_223
100 1 _aTimmerman, Peter.
_eauthor.
_9449261
245 1 0 _aMoral Contract Theory and Social Cognition
_helectronic resource
_bAn Empirical Perspective /
_cby Peter Timmerman.
260 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2014.
300 _aX, 233 p. 7 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aTheory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,
_x0921-3384 ;
_v48
505 0 _aAcknowledgements.- I Introduction.- 1 The Practicability Assumption -- 2 Contract Theory and Perspective-Taking -- 3 Perspective-Taking in Moral Judgment.- 4 Perspective-Taking Accuracy and the Contract Test.- 5 How to Use a Contract Test -- II The Translucency Assumption.- 6 Contract Theory and Translucency.- 7 Translucency and the Irrationality of Straightforward Maximization.- 8 Why Not Be an Opportunist?.- 9 When Constrained Maximization is Rational -- 10 Conclusions.- Appendix.-  Index.
520 _aThis interdisciplinary work draws on research from psychology and behavioral economics to evaluate the plausibility of moral contract theory. In a compelling manner with implications for moral theory more broadly, the author’s novel approach resolves a number of key contingencies in contractarianism and contractualism. Acting in accordance with principles that we could all agree to under certain conditions requires that agents are capable of taking up the perspectives of others. Research in social and developmental psychology shows just how challenging this can be. The author discusses in detail what implications findings on perspective-taking have for contract theory. He concludes with cautious optimism that, despite our limitations, it lies within our power to become better at perspective-taking and to adopt a contractarian or contractualist mode of moral thinking. This does however require us to be much more attentive to the standpoints of others than we tend to be.  Contract theorists also assume that agents can be moved to comply with principles that would be the object of agreement, with some arguing they can be so moved out of their own interest. The book show that, in contrast to the suspicion of many philosophers, this idea is largely supported by research on the dynamics of trust and our ability to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy others. Bringing a welcome dose of realism to the debate on contract theory, the author shows the value of assessing moral theories from an empirical perspective.
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
_9566367
650 0 _aEthics.
_9293107
650 0 _aPolitical science
_xPhilosophy.
_9136178
650 0 _aApplied psychology.
_9303992
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
_9138650
650 2 4 _aEthics.
_9293107
650 2 4 _aIndustrial, Organisational and Economic Psychology.
_9444985
650 2 4 _aPolitical Philosophy.
_9309428
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_9143950
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
830 0 _aTheory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,
_9449262
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04262-6
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c400637